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“We knew what was happening around us. We could see it coming. But we were too scared to 
say anything.” 
 
A Maranao woman reflecting on her experiences in the months leading up to the 2017 Marawi 
siege by pro-Islamic State militants in the southern Philippines.2 
 
1 Corresponding Author Contact: Kiriloi Ingram, Email: kingram@csu.edu.au, Australian Graduate School of 
Policing and Security, Charles Sturt University, Canberra ACT, Australia 
2 All interviews were conducted on the condition of anonymity.  
Abstract 
This policy paper provides a guiding framework for centralising the role of local 
women in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) and 
peacebuilding programmes. It draws on the author’s research into the gendered 
appeals of violent extremist propaganda and field experiences implementing 
programmes across Southeast Asia. The approach outlined here builds on the 
“linkage” approach to propaganda analysis and P/CVE programme design arguing 
that women need to be capacitated with the knowledge and strategic tools and 
empowered through women’s networks to develop locally nuanced solutions. The 
Capacitate to Outcompete, Persuade, and Empower (C.O.P.E) framework consists 
of four broad pillars. First, workshops to educate women about violent extremist 
strategies and P/CVE and peacebuilding approaches. Second, narrative-driven 
actions led by women addressing key psychosocial, political, economic, and 
health issues. Third, strategic communications efforts to promote empowerment 
goals. Fourth, establish grassroots women’s networks as forums for bonding, 
support, and organisation for collective action. This paper highlights experiences 
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An interviewee expressed this sentiment to me almost two years after a pro-Islamic State 
group, led by Isnilon Hapilon and the Maute Brothers, captured Marawi City in 2017 (Franco 
2020; Jadoon, Jahanbanim and Willis 2020). During group discussions in workshops with 
women from Marawi, participants often expressed feelings of guilt and sadness at their city’s 
situation and their sense of powerlessness leading up to, during, and after the siege. For a 
range of reasons, women often found themselves at the forefront of the conflict. In the months 
leading up to the siege, many said they were aware Islamic State elements were infiltrating 
the community and recruiting men, women and children. Yet, they felt unable to talk about 
what was going on around them because they were afraid of the repercussions. Indeed, this 
sentiment was a recurring theme in discussions with women across the Philippines, Indonesia 
and Bangladesh demonstrating the unique gendered experiences violent extremism has on 
women at the local level, the diverse roles women play in violent extremist groups, and the 
integral role female-led initiatives have on preventing violent extremist influence within their 
communities. Reflecting the experiences of women in other parts of the world (Kaufman and 
Williams 2012; Fink et al 2016; Ndung’u et al 2017), these women often highlighted the 
plethora of structural and perceptual barriers existing within their societies which hinders their 
agency, silences their voices, produces gendered harms and fuels violent extremism.3 This 
policy paper provides a guiding framework for centralising the role of local women in 
preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) and peacebuilding programmes. It 
draws on my research into the gendered appeals of violent extremist propaganda and field 
experiences implementing programming across Southeast Asia. 
There is increasing appreciation for the gendered impacts of conflict and roles of 
women in conflict prevention, resolution, and peacebuilding. United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1325 is celebrated as an important step forward yet implementing the Women, 
Peace and Security (WPS) agenda in localised contexts has proven problematic (Manchanda 
2020; Kaufman and Williams 2012, 97) and seen by some as unsuitable to address local 
 
3 These gendered experiences are not unique to Southeast Asia, and the author’s experiences supporting 
programme development in Raqqa, Syria, have highlighted the broadly shared experiences of women in 
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gendered dynamics of violent extremism (Al-Kadi and Vale 2020, 249; Ni Aolain 2016). 
Scholarship devoted to comprehensively understanding women and gender in relation to 
violent extremism has grown significantly in recent years (Bloom 2011; Khalil 2019; 
Alexander 2019; Vale 2019) with much of this research seeking to dismantle persistent 
gendered assumptions about women’s motivations and recruitment (Sjoberg and Gentry 2011 
and 2016; Gentry, Sjoberg and Shepherd 2018; Parashar 2014). For example, scholars detail 
women’s active roles as fundraisers, propagandists, recruiters, “reproducers,” and combatants, 
and warn that positive-security biases afforded to women have potentially lethal consequences 
(e.g. Bloom 2017; Bloom and Matfess 2016; Bloom and Lokmanoglu 2020; Wood 2019; 
Fulmer et al 2019). Some literature also argues that because women are uniquely impacted by 
violent extremism (e.g. Kaufman and Williams 2012; Sjoberg 2014), gender perspectives and 
women’s voices must be integrated into P/CVE (e.g. Cook 2020; True and Eddyono 2017; 
Davies and True 2019; Fink et al 2016; White 2020; Donnelly 2021). 
This policy paper builds on the works of scholars such as Manchanda (2020), George 
(2020), Al-Kadi and Vale (2020) who critically assess external developmental actors applying 
Western centric “one-size-fits-all” policies, without a thorough investigation into local 
nuances, gender dynamics, and pre-existing factors which create inequalities. Manchanda 
(2020, 76) argues that for the WPS discourse to have meaningful impact on the lived realities 
of women, “its global prescriptive norms and priorities need to be mediated by sensitivity to 
contextual differences and diversities.” Ndung’u et al similarly emphasise, “in order for 
P/CVE policies and programmes to respond to the specific needs of women, it is necessary for 
them to be anchored on evidence-based, nuanced and context-specific information” (2017, 
iii). Without an understanding of the complex and multifaceted dynamics of women, gender 
and violent extremism, responses will fail local women and could inadvertently exacerbate 
insecurities that drive violent extremism. 
This policy paper argues that local female perspectives, participation in decision-
making processes, and empowerment is key to safeguarding women and communities against 
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approach (Ingram 2016b; Berger 2018; Reed and Dowling 2018; Whittaker and Elsayed 
2019; Zeiger et al 2021) to propaganda analysis and P/CVE design,4 it recommends 
capacitating local women with the knowledge and strategic tools to understand and confront 
violent extremists and other peace spoilers (pillar one), the material support to engage in 
narrative-driven actions (pillar two) and strategic communications (pillar three), and the 
establishment of local women’s networks for organising collective action (pillar four). To 
these ends, this paper outlines the four pillars of the Capacitate to Out-Compete, Persuade and 
Empower (C.O.P.E) framework. These interconnected pillars are designed to “out-compete” 
violent extremists by positioning local women at front and centre in efforts to address key 
gender, psychosocial, political, and economic vulnerabilities through a range of strategic 
actions. The C.O.P.E framework was developed based on a combination of scholarly research 
and my professional experiences designing and implementing preventing and countering 
violent extremism and peacebuilding programmes, working mostly with civil society actors in 
Southeast Asia. The framework reflects the insights and experiences gained from engaging 
with local women from communities across Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines. 
This policy paper begins by reviewing literature on gender, violent extremism, and 
approaches to P/CVE. It then establishes two conceptual premises underpinning C.O.P.E. 
First, the positive links between female empowerment and social cohesion which is a crucial 
for thwarting the appeal of violent extremists. Second, the “linkage” approach which 
emphasises the importance of out-competing violent extremists through persuasive 
communications synchronised with actions, i.e., narrative-driven actions (Ingram 2016b; 
Berger 2018; Ingram 2020). Next it offers a scholarly and empirical base for C.O.P.E by 
addressing the logic of violent extremist targeting of women, the role of women in violent 
extremist movements, and the potential resonance of these appeals and opportunities to 
women. The paper then outlines the four pillars of the C.O.P.E framework and reflects on 
 
4 Integrating peacebuilding approaches into programme design can help achieve P/CVE outcomes. For example, 
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lessons that have emerged during its implantation.5 Ultimately, C.O.P.E offers overarching 
guidelines for policy and programme development with each pillar being purposely broad to 
facilitate the integration of local design and implementation nuances. 
 
Research Trends in Gender, Violent Extremism, and P/CVE 
 
This paper contributes to two streams of research. The first stream examines motivations for 
joining violent extremist groups as well as violent extremists’ gendered strategies. These 
works argue that men and women are similarly driven by a mix of political, personal, rational-
choice (e.g. promises of security and stability) and identity-choice factors (e.g. promises of 
belonging), and actively engage in terrorism of their own accord (e.g. Parashar 2014; Bloom 
2011; Margolin 2019; de Leede 2018; de Leede 2021; Alison 2008; Mackenzie 2012; 
Kaufman and Williams 2012; Asal and Jadoon 2019; Sjoberg and Gentry 2011; Rafiq and 
Malik 2015). Research into violent extremist strategies contend that violent extremists 
mobilise women because female recruits offer strategic benefits to the group (Davis 2013; 
Khalil 2019; Cook and Vale 2019). For example, Wood (2019, 4), Margolin (2019), Bloom 
and Lokamoglu (2020, 8), Donnelly (2018) and Khelghat-Doost (2018, 854) argue that 
organisations such as Islamic State and Boko Haram recruit women as pragmatic contributors 
to organisational success. Some scholars suggest that movements which mobilise women are 
more likely to achieve organisational objectives because women signal greater community 
support, that it increases perceived legitimacy, and contributes to tactical effectiveness (Bigio 
and Volgestein 2019; Matfess 2020; Bloom and Matfess 2016; Fulmer et al. 2019). My article 
similarly argues that policy and P/CVE practitioners must recognise that women are 
motivated by a complex mix of political, psychosocial, economic and personal factors, and 
are recruited by organisations, such as Islamic State, due to the strategic advantages women 
offer. 
 
5 This paper presents the broad principles of the C.O.P.E framework. It has been applied in the field and future 
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The second stream of research relates to women’s roles in P/CVE. Common across 
these works is that gender inequality drives female recruitment, and female empowerment is 
key to safeguarding communities (Couture 2014; OSCE 2019; Fink et al 2016; Ndung’u et al 
2017). However, two debates emerge at this juncture. First are criticisms of the militarisation 
of the WPS agenda and instrumentalization of women for counterterrorism. For example, 
directing resources towards integrating women into security sectors instead of disarmament 
and demilitarisation (Coomaraswamy et al 2015; Manchanda 2020; 70; Oudraat 2016, 26). 
However, there can be benefits to women’s integration into security forces. For example, 
Bloom (2017) states that  
 
…if security forces avoid invasively searching women for fear of outraging the local 
conservative population…women are the ideal stealth operatives. If security personnel 
are too aggressive in searching women, they aid terrorist recruitment by…providing 
terrorists with propaganda that ‘our women’ are being violated. 
 
Integrating women into security forces could potentially curb these obstacles (OSCE 
2019). Furthermore, women may feel more comfortable reporting issues, particularly personal 
violence, to female security personnel (UNHRC 2021). Yet the opposite may also be true 
where women’s distrust to security extends to female officers, indicating that perceptions of 
mistrust are associated with the institutions and roles people undertake. Deeper institutional 
reforms are needed so that women feel safe approaching security personnel (such as 
addressing sexual abuse of women in custody, the sceptical treatment of victims, and 
impunity of perpetrators in the Philippines, see Amnesty International 2001; Nguyen 2019).  
Second are debates over harnessing women’s positions as mothers and wives. 
Numerous scholars suggest that mothers can play important preventative roles (Majoran 2015; 
Eddyono and Davies 2018; True and Eddyono 2017; Schlaffer and Kropiunigg 2016). 
Counterarguments stress that this essentialises women’s roles and further confines women to 
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capital of motherhood shifts responsibility from states to mothers and results in putting 
women’s lives and rights at risk. Winterbotham (2018) argues that such initiatives assume 
mothers do know best, without evaluating of their effectiveness. Furthermore, Winterbotham 
(2018) argues that focusing on women as mothers and wives diminishes the security threat 
women pose rendering security responses insufficient.  
These debates are rooted in International Relations and feminist International 
Relations scholarship on women’s roles in peacebuilding. Callaway (in Kaufman and 
Williams 2012, 61) argues that emphasising mothers and wives in conflict “presents a 
contradiction: the value given to female roles emphasises gender polarity, thus strengthening 
male roles as the dominant structure.” On the other hand, Kaufman and Williams (2012, 60) 
find that many women self-identify and harness their roles as mothers and wives as a platform 
to political action and empowerment. Women thus “integrate what would be the traditional 
and private with the public and often feminist in order to take a political stand” (Kaufman and 
Williams, 2012, 62). Thompson and Eade (2004) found that the mother identity drew women 
together enabling them to establish support and security networks which are critical during 
times of conflict. Koppell (in Kaufman and Williams 2012, 13) suggests that,  
 
…By presupposing that all women’s political activism is overtly feminist…the 
literature misses some of the subtilities that would otherwise help us understand why 
and how women act in the ways in which they do. Furthermore, it often puts women’s 
attitudes regarding ‘feminism’ or ‘activism’ into a Western understanding of the terms. 
While many in the West would demean or look down upon women who define their 
activism based on their roles as mothers, in a non-Western setting many cultures 
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As Kaufmann and Williams (2012, 92) assert, “The important point is that regardless 
of the particular ideological approach that was taken…the goal was the same, and that is 
women working actively for peace and the restructuring of society after conflict.” 
Women’s positions should not be further entrenched into the private sphere. However, 
this paper argues that inadvertently undermining mothers and wives by highlighting the 
minimal influence they have in their own household and community can implicitly disparage 
many women’s self-prescribed identities. Women already feel voiceless and powerless, often 
within their own home. By overtly emphasising economic recovery, and thus local women’s 
integration into the market economy, liberal peacebuilding agendas and aligned P/CVE could 
reinforce perceptions of female worthlessness. As Rowlands (1995, 104) asserts, 
 
Economic activities may widen the range of options for marginalised people, but do 
not necessarily enable them to reach a point where they can take charge of creating for 
themselves the options from which they get to choose. To do that, a combination of 
confidence and self-esteem, information, analytical skills, ability to identify and tap 
into available resources, political and social influence…is needed. 
 
Development and peacebuilding policies designed to empower women must be 
realistic with their goals and expectations. This can only occur if programming is locally 
designed and implemented. Indeed, the overarching goal of C.O.P.E is to support, capacitate 
and empower local women to enable those women to develop locally nuanced solutions to the 
challenges they face.  
This argument also draws on George’s (2020) research in Papua New Guinea and the 
Solomon Islands examining the blind faith in applying the “economic peace paradigm” (the 
concept that integrating women into the formal market economy results in a substantial peace 
dividend, a concept that has been transferred to P/CVE) onto diverse communities while 
ignoring the “complex gendered realities that shape women’s lives in post-conflict contexts” 
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causes more gendered burden, insecurity, and violence from family members who resent their 
earnings: “…the assumed peace dividend that accrues from women’s earnings is not one that 
is paid voluntarily by women, but is produced in ways that undermine individual women’s 
wellbeing” (George, 2020, 51). George reflects on discussions she had with local women who 
attended programmes on business development, and recounts one woman describing the 
sessions as “depressing: ‘The trainers fill my head full of ideas about what I can do, but I look 
around me and realise I can’t do any of it’” (George, 2020, 53). Nguyen similarly interviewed 
a woman in the Philippines who sought education, financial independence, and professional 
development, but was abused by her husband due to what “he sees as a breach of long-
standing norms that wives should stay home and care for the family” (Nguyen, 2019, 431). 
Similar sentiments were expressed to me during discussions with women across 
Southeast Asia. This is not to say that financial independence and women’s access to work 
should not be prioritised, and the harms of material deprivation and the benefits of economic 
agency must never be dismissed as these are vital goals. Rather, these tensions underscore the 
need for locally contextualised approaches that progressively address broader structural and 
perceptual barriers to empowerment by recognising the often harsh, jarring realities of life for 
women living in certain parts of the world. This necessitates a whole of community and 
multilayered government approach with efforts to shape perceptions on women’s worth and 
what women can and cannot do. As Kabeer (2005, 13) states,  
 
…education, employment, and political participation…is considered essential to the 
achievement of gender equality and women’s empowerment. Each of these resources 
certainly has the potential to bring about positive changes in women’s lives, but, in 
each case, it is the social relationships that govern access to the resource in question 
that will determine the extent to which this potential is realised. 
 
Furthermore, empirical research must be calibrated to not only inform policy, 
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that inevitably informs policy and design. Consequently, local women themselves must play a 
central role in identifying appropriate indicators of change that then inform programme 
evaluation design. Empowerment – and the means of realising it – ought to be defined by 
local women. 
 
Establishing C.O.P.E’s Foundations: Empowering Women, Out-Competing Violent 
Extremists 
 
C.O.P.E is built on two broad premises. First, empowering women is an essential goal, with 
positive effects on community cohesion, peacebuilding, and P/CVE. For the purposes of my 
paper, empowerment is the process through which the disempowered acquires the ability to 
make choices, particularly strategic life choices like where to live, whether to marry, whether 
to work, and whether to have children. According to Kabeer (2005), three dimensions form 
empowerment – agency, resources and achievements. Agency is when choices are made and 
put into effect (Kabeer 2005, 14). Agency is not simply exercising choice but challenging 
power relations in exercising that choice. Empowerment and disempowerment are thus 
relational: “empowerment is rooted in how people see themselves – their sense of self-worth. 
This in turn is critically bound up with how they are seen by those around them and by their 
society” (Kabeer 2005, 15). Closely related are resources, which are the mediums through 
which agency is exercised. They encompass material and social resources which affect the 
ability to make choices. For example, “If a woman’s primary form of access to resources is as 
a dependent member of the family, her capacity to make strategic choices is likely to be 
limited” (Kabeer 2005, 15). Resources and agency combined make up one’s potential for 
living the lives they want. Therefore, perceptual and structural barriers may inhibit 
empowerment.  
My paper argues that pre-existing gender inequalities and harms drive violent 
extremist recruitment. Therefore, female empowerment is key to safeguarding women and 
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and a peaceful democratic society are well established (Nagel 2020; Hunt and Posa 2009; 
Hudson et al 2012; Lee-Koo 2011; Bouta et al 2004; Anderlini 2007; Kaufman and Williams 
2012). Women’s equal ability to become politically active and make decisions leads to more 
representative institutions and policies, which is vital for conflict resolution. As Kaufman and 
Williams stress, long-lasting peacebuilding requires reducing the fundamental causes of 
conflict (2012, 95). Reconstruction thus necessitates reform rather than a “return to normal” 
(Manchanda 2020, 69), and this can only be achieved if women are politically included 
(Bouta et al 2004, 52). This is particularly important from a P/CVE perspective because the 
political exclusion of women creates a vulnerability that could be exploited by violent 
extremists. The final pillar of the C.O.P.E framework recommends establishing forums 
comprised of local women and female-led civil society to facilitate dialogue, cooperation, and 
inclusive decision-making. 
The four interconnected pillars of C.O.P.E are designed to break down perceptual and 
structural barriers which prevent women from safely realising their agency. This is because 
the gendered inequalities experienced by women in some areas, such as in health and 
education (Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray 2015), can have negative feedback loops 
impeding women’s agency in other areas such as in social and economic participation (Loya 
2014). Gendered health issues stemming from sexual exploitation, domestic violence, genital 
mutilation, rape, adolescent pregnancy, unsafe abortion, and forced marriages are a result of, 
and perpetuate female disempowerment. For instance, mothers aged 15-19 are twice as likely 
to die of pregnancy complications compared to women aged 20-24 (UNFPA 2020b), and 
infant mortality is 45% higher when births are separated by less than 2 years compared to 2-3 
years (WHO 2020, Molitoris et al 2020). In the Philippines, childbearing adolescents are less 
likely to complete secondary education hindering future employment opportunities (UNFPA 
2020a) and are more likely to experience violence within their relationship (Raj and Boehmer 
2013). Unsafe abortion similarly has negative short and long-term health, social and economic 
repercussions on women, their families, and the state (Singh 2010). The continuing 
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These types of physical, psychological, and social harms can offer opportunities for 
violent extremist exploitation by offering false promises of hope and empowerment. P/CVE 
policy and programming must therefore be tailored to address and prevent gendered harms. 
The second pillar of C.O.P.E is designed to “out-compete” violent extremists by 
implementing community activities, designed and led by local women, which target key 
psychosocial, political, economic, and health vulnerabilities. For example, facilitating access 
to reproductive health, family planning resources and psychosocial rehabilitation can reduce 
associated short-term and long-term negative health impacts on women, as well as on family 
members and the broader community (Varkey et al 2010; Klevens and Ports 2017; World 
Bank 2012; Gates 2019; Sen 2001). However, addressing the underlying perceptual, social, 
and power dynamics (Bosley 2020) which prohibit women’s agency is crucial to ensuring 
women can safely access resources without fear of violence, ostracization and further 
insecurity. Thus, the third pillar of C.O.P.E focuses on persuasive communications that shapes 
local perceptions on issues such as perceptions of women’s worth, what women can and 
cannot do, and victim shaming. 
The second premise is rooted in Ingram’s “linkage” approach (e.g. Ingram 2017; 
Ingram 2016b). The “linkage” approach has been applied as an analytical framework in 
scholarly publications including journal articles (Ingram 2015; Ingram 2016a; Berger 2017; 
Whiteside 2018; Reed and Dowling 2018; Whittaker and Elsayed 2019; Zeiger et al 2021) 
and books (Berger 2018; Ingram, Winter, Whiteside 2020). The linkage approach has also 
been applied as an evaluation mechanism for assessing P/CVE messaging (Whittaker and 
Elsayed 2019) while the practical methodology has informed programming in several 
countries across Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, especially where the Islamic 
State and al-Qa’ida have been most active. A core principle of the “linkage” approach is the 
importance of out-competing violent extremist influence through competing “systems of 
control” (via actions) and “systems of meaning” (via messaging). This principle reflects a 
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propaganda is to shape the perceptions and mobilise the support of target audiences by 
deploying rational-choice and identity-choice messaging (Ingram 2015). 
Rational-choice messaging tends to be used to promote a violent extremist group’s 
“competitive systems of control,” i.e. its politico-military and social systems intended to 
address the needs of the populace (Fall 1965). According to David Kilcullen, “In irregular 
conflicts…the local armed actor that a given population perceives as best able to establish a 
predictable, consistent, and wide-spectrum normative system of control is most likely to 
dominate that population and its residential areas” (Kilcullen, 2013, 126). For example, 
following military victories across Syria and Iraq, Islamic State sought to fill power vacuums 
by administering a system of governance (Kilcullen 2015; Zelin 2015; Milton 2016; Winter 
2018; Whiteside 2016) and official Islamic State propaganda amplified these activities 
(Islamic State Report 2014a; Islamic State Report 2014b) by portraying its alternative 
governance initiatives (Islamic State News 2014a; Islamic State Report 2014c) as the only 
reliable sources of credibility, legitimacy, stability and livelihood (Ingram, Winter, Whiteside 
2020, 168). These rational-choice factors feature prominently in Islamic State propaganda to 
female audiences (Ingram 2019) and are central to mobilising female support. 
Identity-choice messaging seeks to construct a “competitive system of meaning” for 
its audiences by offering an alternative frame through which to interpret the world. In the case 
of the Islamic State, this frame positions it as the champion of an in-group (i.e. Islamic State-
aligned Sunni Muslims) and the bearers of solutions confronting crisis causing out-group 
identities (literally everyone else) who threaten the in-group’s existence. Such “linkage 
dynamics” (Ingram 2017; Berger 2018) seek to motivate audiences to shape their own 
identities to align with the Islamic State’s identity, solution and crisis constructs. This 
provokes readers to make “logic of appropriateness” decisions – decisions in accordance with 
their adopted identities. Rational-choice and identity-choice appeals are mutually reinforcing. 
When targeting women, for instance, the Islamic State breaks down in-group and out-group 
identities into five individual gender identities, or female representations: “supporter,” 
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group, and “victim” is in need of saving (Ingram 2016c, Ingram 2018, Ingram 2019). The five 
female representations symbolise how to and not to behave and offer women alternative paths 
to empowerment through action and powerful identities. 
These two premises have important implications for peacebuilding and P/CVE policy 
and programming. The first underscores the importance of empowering women to strengthen 
community cohesion and safeguard women from extremist influence. However, barriers to 
female empowerment are rooted in perceptions (dominant systems of meaning) and structures 
(dominant systems of control) which limit women’s agency and ability to access resources. 
Violent extremist groups attempt to exploit these pre-existing inequalities by offering women 
a competitive system of meaning (e.g. a reality where women are valued and needed) and 
competitive systems of control (e.g. access to services and opportunities for security and 
livelihood) as pathways to empowerment. The second suggests that P/CVE policy and 
programming must be designed to out-compete violent extremist’s false promises of 
empowerment through persuasive communications that are supported by and synchronised 
with actions on the ground. These narrative-driven actions must be geared towards shaping 
perceptions on gender equality, facilitating women’s access to resources (social, political, 
education, legal, security, economic and health infrastructure) and improving the welfare of 
women individually and collectively (e.g. addressing physical and psychological challenges 
such as through trauma-informed care, see Bosley 2020; McDonald 2010; McDevitt-Murphy 
et al 2010). 
 
Building an Empirical Base  
 
Having outlined the major scholarly trends and conceptual premises upon which C.O.P.E is 
based, it is important to now consider four key areas that must be incorporated into P/CVE 
programme design including the logic of violent extremist targeting of women, the role of 
women in violent extremist movements, and the potential resonance of these appeals and 
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dynamics with strategies informed by an understanding of the local violent extremist 
organisation/s operating in the area. The focus of this analysis is on Islamic State, reflective of 
where the programme has been applied, and woven throughout are reflections from my 
professional experiences working with women in areas where Islamic State have been active 
in the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. The insights of local women were collected 
during group discussions conducted across capacity-building workshops attended by a total of 
81 participants. These workshops were conducted in Indonesia, Bangladesh, and the 
Philippines. On the condition of anonymity,6 participants verbally consented to their insights 
and perspectives being collected during these discussions.7 
 
Islamic State propaganda appeals to women: five female representations 
A study of how the Islamic State constructs its propaganda to appeal to women 
contributed to the empirical foundations of C.O.P.E’s policy principles (Ingram 2021). 
Islamic State propaganda targeting women tends to leverage five female representations 
(Ingram 2016c; Ingram 2018; Ingram 2021). “Supporter,” “mother/sister/wife” and “fighter” 
are constructed as members of the in-group and act as standards to be emulated. “Corruptor” 
women are presented as members of the out-group whose behaviours should be rejected, and 
“victim” represents women in need and worthy of being saved (Ingram 2016c; Ingram 2021). 
These representations are used to shape how audiences perceive what it means to be a “good” 
Muslim woman (according to Islamic State) by linking positive or negative traits to each 
representation. Islamic State messaging draws on jurisprudence to call for strict binary gender 
roles framed as being innate to men and women. If men and women transgress these roles 
prescribed by the Islamic State, they violate nature and the will of God. This in turn motivates 
women to conform to Islamic State’s expectations of “real” women.  
 
6 No identifying information on the participants was collected. All consent was given on the condition of 
anonymity.  
7 All women provided written informed consent to participating in the programme and research when signing in 
as a participant to the workshops. Their consent to participate was then requested again verbally in their 
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Cost-benefit (or rational-choice) reasoning is also used by Islamic State propagandists 
to convince women that it is the safer and smarter option to conform to its in-group female 
representations. Islamic State achieve this by portraying women as victims of localised 
gendered crises. Gendered crises are personal experiences of the global crisis inflicted upon 
the Ummah by the out-group. For example, Umm Sulaym al-Muhajirah describes feelings of 
alienation and concern for the welfare of her children while living in Australia, which she 
rectified by becoming a “supporter” and performing hijrah (migration) to the Caliphate 
(Rumiyah 2017a, 30-35). As a result, gendered messaging situates the conflict at the local, 
individual level to place the responsibility to act on to the audience member. Audiences are 
presented with an opportunity to be their own solution to personal crises by conforming to in-
group female representations. Leveraging gender thus personalises Islamic State’s 
competitive system of meaning and presents how Islamic State’s actions can help resolve 
women’s gendered insecurities. 
Strategically, the roles, values and behaviours characterising in-group female 
representations are actions which are likely to directly benefit Islamic State’s socio-political 
and military objectives on the ground. In-group female representations therefore aim to 
empower and persuade women that they have individual agency and play important roles in 
establishing a Caliphate and saving the in-group (e.g. al-Muhajirah 2015b, 44). For example, 
“supporter” women live outside of Islamic State territory and must migrate to the Caliphate to 
save themselves and strengthen the in-group (Dabiq 2015a, 50-51; Al-Muhājirah 2015a, 32-
37; Rumiyah 2017b, 34-35; Rumiyah 2017c, 30-35). “Mothers/sisters/wives” are promised 
security and better livelihoods in the Caliphate where they must raise the next generation of 
“lion cubs” (Al-Muhājirah 2015b, 44; Rumiyah 2017b, 34; Rumiyah 2017d, 18) and 
encourage men to wage jihad (Rumiyah 2016a, 28-30; Rumiyah 2016b, 32-33; Rumiyah 
2017e, 12-15). If conditions deem it necessary, “fighter” women are encouraged to take up 
arms and join men on the frontlines (Inside the Caliphate 2018).  
An analysis of gendered appeals in Islamic State propaganda targeted towards women 
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female representations in Dabiq, and 64.5 per cent of all female representations in Rumiyah 
(Ingram 2021). This suggests that Islamic State is likely to prioritise positive and empowering 
appeals when seeking to target and appeal to women. However, it is important to note that 
when Islamic State manipulates gender constructs in messaging targeted towards broader 
audiences (i.e. largely male-dominated audiences), it tends to be dominated by negative 
female representations (i.e. “corruptor” and “victim” representations constitute 53.6 per cent 
of representation occurrences in Dabiq and 58.33 per cent in Rumiyah). This suggests that 
when Islamic State are seeking to appeal to women it is positive and empowering appeals that 
are likely to dominate in contrast to negative portrayals of women as “victims” and 
“corruptors” when it is appealing to broader, predominantly male, audiences. 
These female representations are manipulated differently contingent upon strategic 
context, territorial control, and target audience (Ingram 2018). This follows a clear strategic 
logic, whereby it is in Islamic State’s best interest for the roles of women to change to cater to 
its changing politico-military needs. During periods of strength (e.g. circa 2014-2016), its 
messaging tended to portrayed women as strategically valuable to address the needs of a 
functioning polity. Reflecting this, “supporter” and “mother/sister/wife” representations were 
most significant in messaging targeted towards women, comprising 16.86 per cent and 62.79 
per cent of all female representations respectively (Ingram 2021).  
As Islamic State transitioned to an insurgency (e.g. circa 2017-present), messaging 
portrayed women as still essential for responding to pressures on resources, personnel losses, 
and defeat on the frontline. The prominence of the “supporter” representation dramatically 
decreased to 5.03 per cent coinciding with the Islamic State’s territorial losses, potentially 
indicating a reduced need to coax women to perform hijrah to a crumbling Caliphate. Instead, 
messaging emphasised the correct conduct of “true” Muslim “mothers,” “sisters” and “wives” 
as the primary focus (69.18 per cent). Women were also portrayed fighting for the first time in 
2018 (Inside the Caliphate 2018). While “fighter” rarely occurred in female specific articles, 
its frequency in messaging designed for male audiences increased by 83.3 per cent (Ingram 
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insurgency, its attempts to shame men towards taking action significantly increased. 
Monitoring the frequency with which these representations are deployed in the Islamic State’s 
propaganda is vital for assessing how the group is seeking to appeal to women and, more 
broadly, offers insights into its strategic thinking. Current research is examining the role of 
these representations in far-right extremist propaganda, and the implications for P/CVE. 
 
Local recruitment and drivers of support 
The recurring feedback I received from women in Indonesia, Bangladesh and the 
Philippines was that Islamic State’s local efforts to recruit women played on these five female 
representations in locally nuanced ways. In these contexts, poverty and stability were 
described as factors that motivated women, often alongside the influence of family members, 
to join the local Islamic State group operating in their communities. For example, in Indonesia 
many interviewees highlighted how women were the instigating force encouraging their 
families to mobilise locally or migrate to the Caliphate. In Marawi, women were promised 30-
40,000 pesos if they joined Islamic State and with additional financial incentives for 
recruiting others (Ingram 2019). Local women in Mindanao regularly indicated that the 
majority of recruitment occurred in isolated rural areas, where living conditions are poor, and 
recruiters have easier access to populations. The promises of elevated social standing often 
appeared to be at least as powerful a lure for women as financial gain.  
This is not unique to Southeast Asia or even the Islamic State. For example, P/CVE 
strategies in Morocco and Bangladesh identify poverty and women’s lower social standing as 
a catalyst for recruitment (Couture 2014). Nwangwu and Ezeibe (2019) note that 
unemployment and poverty are central to Boko Haram’s recruitment of women and children 
in Kenya. Ndung’u et al. (2017, 33) interviewed women in Majengo and Mombasa and found 
that many joined Al Shabaab because of promises of a job and better livelihoods. They 
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…women involved seem to be caught in the centre of this web: not only are they 
vulnerable to the economic lure of joining an extremist group, but they are also doubly 
affected by the impact of violent extremism…because women experience the 
economic downturn of the communities affected by terrorist attacks as well as often 
losing their families’ breadwinners to violent extremism, through death or recruitment 
(Ndung’u et al., 2017, 34). 
 
Johnston, True and Benalla’s (2019, 28) study of gender dynamics and violent 
extremism in Libya similarly found that the “changing gender roles brought about by the 
economic hardships of war have paradoxically helped violent extremist groups recruit 
women…because violent extremist groups target excluded and vulnerable women…”.  
A consistent theme across scholarly research, and the responses of women during in-
field workshops, are that violent extremists exploit pre-existing gender inequalities by 
offering women prospects of empowerment or, at the very least, relief from these pressures. 
During discussions in Bangladesh women spoke of the impact of everyday insecurities which 
they felt needs to be addressed in any P/CVE and peacebuilding effort, such as not having the 
freedom to talk and fear of violence, while many women in the Philippines discussed traumas 
associated with relationships and even child marriage. For many women, supporting violent 
extremist organisations is a means of exercising agency and taking political action to change 
their lives. Kaufmann and Williams (2012, 64) assert that many of the reasons that motivate 
women to work together for peace are similar to the reasons for engaging in violence. For 
women to support and engage in irregular conflict, women must believe that they have few 
alternatives (Kaufmann and Williams 2012, 64). This suggests that,  
 
…women resort to acts of violence as a source of empowerment, something that they 
often do not experience in traditional, patriarchal societies. Hence, in looking for ways 
to acquire a sense of political agency, they choose a means that allows them to make a 
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It is essential P/CVE initiatives are led by local women who have the experiences and 
understanding of local dynamics and the conditions which may increase susceptibilities to 
violent extremism. This also underscores the importance of out-competing violent extremists 
with actions and messaging to facilitate women’s political activism, access to resources, and 
changing perceptions of women in society. 
 
Women’s roles in Islamic State 
Several studies explore how recruiters promise women important roles which are 
framed to be central to Islamic State’s mission and essential for the survival of women’s 
families and the in-group (Bloom 2011; Vale 2019; Santos 2020; Margolin 2019). Many 
violent extremist groups recognise the tactical advantages (Davis 2013; Margolin 2019) of 
female combatants due to positive-security biases afforded to women. Female combatants in 
Boko Haram have been so effective, killing more than 1,200 people from 2014 to 2018, that 
they comprise almost two-thirds of the group’s suicide attackers (Bloom and Matfess 2016). 
A study by Fulmer et al (2019) compared five different violent extremist groups and found 
that suicide attacks conducted by women were not only less likely to fail but killed an average 
of 8.4 victims compared to 5.3 if the attack was conducted by men. Demonstrating this 
lethality, in August 2020 two women carried out a suicide attack in Sulu in the Philippines 
killing 14 and injuring 75. Indeed, leading up to the Marawi siege, women were recruited as 
snipers due to a belief that women can “focus longer and have steadier hands” (Ingram 2019). 
Women were also used to recruit men and other women by exploiting their roles as 
mothers, sisters and wives (evocative of the “mother/sister/wife” representation). Violent 
extremists will often exploit familial roles to achieve strategic ends. The family attacks in 
Surabaya in 2018, a couple’s suicide bombing in Jolo in 2019, and a husband and wife’s 
suicide bombing in Makassar in 2021 exemplify this strategy. This tactic also highlights the 
important auxiliary roles women play in violent extremist organisations. Reports by Bigio and 
Vogelstein (2019) and the UNODC (2019) detail women’s roles as recruiters, law enforcers 
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(2020, 5) highlights strategic benefits female membership offers such as logistics 
management, clandestine operations, legitimising group activity, and boosting members’ 
morale. The women interviewed in Al Jazeera’s “Women of ISIL” provide graphic details of 
the Al-Khansaa Brigade’s brutality towards female “transgressors” (Al Jazeera 2019). Failing 
to recognise the strategic importance of women for violent extremist objectives can have 
negative impacts on security and P/CVE development. This further underscores the need for 
female led P/CVE that holistically addresses the vulnerabilities driving women to violent 
extremism. 
 
Gendered impacts of violent extremism 
The insecurities women experience in conflicted affected environments are 
exacerbated by violent extremism. Women are susceptible to sexual violence perpetrated by 
those who are supposed to protect them, such as security personnel, in internally displaced 
persons (IDP) camps and in evacuation centres (Nguyen 2019; Amnesty International 2001). 
For example, women in Mindanao expressed a range of psychosocial insecurities resulting 
from ongoing, multigenerational violence. Feelings of hopelessness are exacerbated through 
cycles of displacement to evacuation centres and return to destroyed homes (Dwyer and 
Cagoco-Guiam 2012). Women and girls in IDP camps suffer the brunt of protracted conflicts, 
with limited access to feminine hygiene and reproductive health resources (Tanyag 2016). 
Women whose husbands leave for conflict or are killed suffer immense economic strain 
increasing their vulnerabilities to exploitation (Tanyag 2016). Women who manage to find 
employment may then feel guilty for neglecting traditional roles and are often subjected to 
backlash (New Humanitarian 2008). According to several reports, the increased economic 
pressures during and after the Marawi siege resulted in an increase in child marriages, 
commercial sexual exploitation, and domestic violence (UNFPA 2019; Cepeda 2019).  
These traumas and insecurities provide fertile ground for violent extremist influence. 
This is because violent extremist groups benefit strategically from both the subjugation of 
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violent extremist organisations designed to perpetuate inequalities (Hudson and Hodgson 
2020). The previous discussion explored how Islamic State propaganda and local recruitment 
efforts exploit women’s marginalisation by offering false promises of empowerment. Yet, 
violent extremist groups also direct violence toward women as a means of driving instability 
in the community, sabotaging social cohesion, and widening gender disparities. As Bloom and 
Matfess state, “Understood as a means of fostering cohesiveness among forcibly conscripted 
soldiers, while simultaneously undermining external social bonds and instilling fear, violence 
against women is particularly suited to the goals of terrorist organisations” (Bloom and 
Matfess, 2016, 107). 
Rape and sexual violence are common instruments of war due to the devastating 
effects it has on victims, families, communities, and its ability to destroy cultures. McDevitt-
Murphy et al (2010, 294) state “because of women’s role in maintaining family and 
community cohesion, mass sexual assault destroys the social fabric.” A former member of Al 
Shabaab interviewed by Ndung’u et al. (2017, 33) reveals abhorrent gendered violence: 
 
We experienced sexual, verbal and physical abuse. Some girls were forcefully 
married. Almost 75% of the girls were infected with HIV. The fighters would not use 
protection and would forcefully have sex with the girls when they were menstruating. I 
did not get married and did not have children when I was at the camp. Other girls had 
babies; there were many children in this camp and no one was really taking care of 
them. We were forced to take drugs mixed with water. 
 
Violent extremist groups may benefit financially from rape and sexual violence. 
Islamic State enforced the enslavement of Yazidi women and girls and generated an estimated 
US $90 million through extortion and ransoms (Hutchinson 2020; Bigio 2020; Al-Dayel, 
Mumford and Bales 2020). Boko Haram similarly kidnaps women and girls to lure security 
forces into an ambush and generate ransom payments (Bloom and Matfess 2016). Women in 
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destroy community cohesion. Because of this targeting, women were often the first to identify 
Islamic State’s infiltration into their communities. These gendered impacts highlight that local 
women see and experience violent extremism differently from men and, often, first. This yet 
again underscores the importance of harnessing women’s voices in P/CVE so that they have 
the opportunity to represent their own interests and address the needs and complexities of 
their communities.   
 
Capacitate to Out-Compete, Persuade, and Empower (C.O.P.E) 
 
Women in communities affected by violent extremism frequently indicate that they feel 
voiceless and powerless. It is clear from this analysis that women must have a central role in 
preventing violent extremist recruitment of not only other women, but of all members of their 
communities. This requires empowering local women and ensuring that their welfare and 
perspectives are prioritised. The C.O.P.E framework offers a methodical and evidence-based 
approach to programme design and implementation calibrated to centralise and enable the role 
of local women. The specific details of each pillar must be established in collaboration with 
the local community and tailored to address the needs, sensitivities, gender, and power 
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Capacitate through education, training and outreach 
The first pillar focuses on local capacity building. Local female-led civil society need 
access to training, presented in the vernacular, that provides them with an understanding of 
trends in violent extremist propaganda and recruitment, community-based approaches to 
prevention, and broad principles for effective civil society P/CVE. These workshops also act 
as forums to connect local women with each other, learn from their collective experiences, 
and encourage support and collaboration. For example, in workshops conducted with women 
in Indonesia, the five female representations of women that characterises gendered 
propaganda resonated with the participants and helped them to make sense of not only their 
experiences but strategies being used by local violent extremists.  
Women who receive this training can then go on to share what they have learned with 
other local women, particularly those in remote areas and vulnerable communities, creating 
sustainable cycles of knowledge sharing through their social networks. Local female-led civil 
society often have a nuanced understanding of their communities and can tailor what they 
have learned to address specific individual and collective needs. Providing material support to 
women’s networks that enable them to have a direct and practical impact on their 
communities is vital. For example, financial and food security pressures have increased across 
Mindanao during the COVID-19 pandemic and so the provision of material support to local 
civil society groups has allowed for food, hygiene kit, and mask distribution synchronised 
with messaging efforts. From a psychosocial perspective, social activities where women can 
be or feel as if they are able to affect change is critical for psychological well-being and 
strengthens people’s sense of self-efficacy (McDonald 2010, 231). 
 
Out-Compete violent extremists and other ‘peace spoilers’ 
Building on the first pillar, the second pillar recommends providing support so that 
local women can address practical needs in their communities through narrative-driven 
actions, i.e. community-based activities delivered with messaging that amplifies the reach and 
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society based system of control and meaning that offers an alternative to those of more malign 
actors such as violent extremists.  
Narrative-driven actions cannot operate on a one size fits all basis but be tailored to the 
local context. Western-centric agendas must be mediated by local gendered “social, political 
and cultural factors that create the condition of vulnerabilities, physical (and sexual), 
economic and social” (Manchanda 2020, 76). This underscores the importance for 
programming to be developed, implemented and evaluated by local female-led groups. 
Furthermore, programmes must have clear and measurable indicators of success across 
locally-informed female empowerment markers such as social (rates of access to education, 
rates of underage marriage), political (female inclusion and agency), economic (whether 
women have a say in household expenditure, whether women can spend income free from 
coercion/backlash, female unemployment rates that do not perpetuate female dominated low 
status jobs), and health markers (rates of violence, access to birth control and health care, 
infant and female mortality). Evaluating the impact and reach of these efforts can be achieved 
through a mix of surveys, interviews, and focus group discussions. These assessments then 
provide an evidence base for shaping and reshaping programming over time. 
 
Persuade via a methodical approach to strategic communications 
The third pillar focuses on persuasive communications driven by three aims. First, 
these communications must offer an alternative to the gender appeals in violent extremist 
propaganda. This requires both an understanding of the strategic logic of gendered appeals 
(e.g. the five female representations) and an understanding of the unique ways in which local 
women and girls are recruited. Applying the linkage approach to strategic communications, 
the key to dismantling violent extremist propaganda appeals to women is to discredit, in the 
example of Islamic State, its five representations of women and how these are linked to its 
competitive systems of meaning and control. For example, Islamic State messaging seeks to 
persuade women living outside of its areas of territorial control that their grievances could be 
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“supporter” to reap the benefits of Islamic State control). Harnessing the voices of women 
who lived under Islamic State control can be a powerful means of delegitimising Islamic 
State’s utopian promises, where in reality women and girls were tortured, murdered, enslaved 
and raped. This also contributes to a broader effort of exacerbating Islamic State’s say-do or 
credibility gap. 
Second, persuasive communications must promote and amplify the practical narrative-
driven actions conducted as part of pillar two. After all, to out-compete violent extremists, 
civil society must present themselves as effective sources of both ‘meaning’ and ‘control’ for 
their communities. Persuasive communications must therefore also reshape those pre-existing 
perceptions in society that generate female disempowerment. Women who attended 
workshops across Indonesia, the Philippines and Bangladesh expressed their biggest concern 
is social perceptions on women’s worth, and that they do not feel safe talking in public. For 
example, the women I engaged with often identified their roles as mothers and wives as 
sources of pride and empowerment – even if others around them do not have the same 
perception. As one woman explained,  
 
To me, ISIS seems like the right way because they say mothers are important. Then 
development people come into my country and say this is not good enough and we 
must get jobs. But in my culture, being a mother is very important. 
 
The third purpose of persuasive communications is therefore to provide women with a 
cost-efficient and effective way of shaping audience perceptions on key issues. Strategic 
communications capacity building workshops can be an invaluable tool to equip local female-
led civil society with the skills needed to develop and design their own proactive messaging 
campaigns which seek to alter perceptions on female empowerment and gender equality. 
Local women have the deepest understanding of hinderances to female empowerment, what 
empowerment realistically looks like in their communities, as well as the factors needed for 
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Empower through connection 
The fourth pillar is arguably the most important: establish grassroots women’s 
networks where women can bond and organise for collective action. Women are often the 
barometers of a community’s susceptibility to violent extremism. However, women need to 
feel safe and comfortable enough to access resources and approach the appropriate authorities 
to seek help. Therefore, to accelerate one woman’s empowerment, connect her to other 
women. These networks then enable women to meaningfully engage with sectors that they 
may feel uncomfortable meeting with individually, such as security and law enforcement 
agencies. Female-led civil society organisations are useful partners in mitigating violence and 
can operate as a mediating body to interact with local police to alert them to gendered safety 
issues they and others in the community are experiencing.  
Access to trauma-informed care is vital and should be integrated across law 
enforcement, social workers, educators, and other social service providers. However, access is 
difficult for displaced peoples and communities with weakened governance. In lieu, social 
connection and support in a physically safe environment is critical for trauma recovery: 
“promoting feelings of safety among traumatised individuals is critical, because any 
previously held sense of safety has been largely disrupted through the experience of a threat 
of annihilation” (McDonald 2010, 228). Connecting women to other women facilitates social 
connection which is essential for traumatised individuals. As McDonald (2010, 233) notes, 
“social support can be restored through group sharing of trauma stories, and these can also be 
facilitated through activities.”  
I have often witnessed it in the workshops I have conducted; one woman shares her 
personal stories of trauma, prompting many other women to feel comfortable enough to share 
their own stories. During focus group discussions in Bangladesh, women discussed problems 
affecting their everyday lives. Women spoke of feeling invisible and ignored. One woman 
said, “From the age of 3, we are taught to be scared of being raped.” Yet, most of the women 
who spoke of their traumas that day also expressed that this workshop was the first time they 
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space connected to women with similar stories. The opportunity to have a voice, share trauma 
stories and connect with women who have similar experiences can be a powerfully cathartic 
process. These social support networks and safe environments are essential for trauma 
recovery, empowerment, as well as prevention and disengagement from violent extremism. 
Just as P/CVE cannot be successful without women, it cannot be successful without 
men. It is essential that policies and programming are geared towards empowering women, 
but this is as a result of deeper structural and perceptual barriers to female empowerment 
which foster violent extremism. The sustainability of any efforts to support women will be 
limited if dominant perceptions and social relations dictate women unworthy of accessing the 
necessary resources and opportunities for empowerment and equality. The structural and 
perceptual barriers discussed in this article will only be comprehensively addressed and 
maintained if both men and women are included in efforts towards gender equality and 
addressing the complex mix of psychosocial, political, and economic factors that render 
communities conducive to violent extremism. 
 
Conclusion 
This policy paper presented a framework for designing P/CVE that centralises local women. It 
incorporates scholarly research and in-field experiences related to the unique gendered 
experiences of violent extremism at the local level, the diverse roles women play in violent 
extremist groups, and the integral role female-led initiatives have on preventing violent 
extremism within their communities. This article argues that local female perspectives, 
participation in decision-making processes, and empowerment is key to safeguarding women 
and communities against violent extremism. The four pillars of the C.O.P.E framework are 
designed to not only address the complex mix of structural and perceptual barriers hindering 
female empowerment and fostering violent extremism, but amplify women’s voices, improves 
their welfare, and enable them to have the power needed to command the trajectory of their 
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